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 i 
Abstract 
New Zealand’s forest industry operates under several codes of practice for erosion and 
sediment control. Inconsistency between regional forestry regulations led industry to 
lobby for the Proposed National Environmental Standard for Plantation Forestry 
(PNESPF). A national code of practice may also need to be introduced to give effect to 
the PNESPF. This dissertation focuses on what type of code of practice should be 
adopted, and under what conditions. 
The conditions required for a code of practice to succeed in protecting the 
environment were identified. The ‘external’ social and legal conditions were identified 
through analysis of three case studies from the international primary sector, whilst the 
‘internal’ conditions relating to the development, content and implementation of a 
code of practice were identified through review of literature. These ideal internal 
conditions formed the basis of the criteria used to assess New Zealand's codes. 
Six of New Zealand’s forest codes of practice were classified by their type, the 
motivation for a corporation to comply with them, and enforcing agency. The internal 
conditions of these codes were then assessed to determine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing documents. Overall, the codes had well-defined objectives, 
good planning information and clear communication. The weaknesses included 
regulatory approach, comprehensiveness, foundation (particularly stakeholder 
involvement), monitoring information and review process. 
The proposed national code of practice, if introduced, should be a prescriptive code. A 
prescriptive code is better than an outcome-based code because it is difficult to prove 
liability for sedimentation and erosion. Compliance with a prescriptive code should be 
like liability insurance, so that if a corporation is fully compliant with a prescriptive 
code of practice, it should not be held liable for adverse environmental impacts. This is 
a preliminary recommendation only, as the external conditions operating in New 
Zealand still need to be investigated. 
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1 Introduction 
The district and regional plans which are used by local government to implement the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) have inconsistent rules for forestry in different 
geographical areas. These rules seemingly constantly change, causing insecurity and 
reducing industry efficiency (Fowler & Pedley, 2012). To remedy this issue the 
Proposed National Environmental Standard for Plantation Forestry (PNESPF) was 
introduced in 2010, with the purpose of providing a consistent set of rules for forestry 
operations nationwide (Fowler & Pedley, 2012). 
As part of the PNESPF development process, the Ministry for the Environment 
commissioned staff from the University of Canterbury’s Schools of Forestry and 
Geological Sciences to analyse erosion risks for New Zealand plantation forestry. The 
resultant report identified the need for a national code of forest engineering practice 
for New Zealand’s plantation forestry industry (Bloomberg, Davies, Visser, & 
Morgenroth, 2011). At present, there are a number of codes and guidelines available 
in New Zealand. These are published by organisations such as the New Zealand Forest 
Owner’s Association (NZFOA), regulatory authorities such as Regional and District 
Councils, and individual forestry corporations. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
The objective of this dissertation is to explore the concept of codes of practice and 
their use in New Zealand forestry, with particular focus on erosion and sediment 
control. By exploring this concept, this dissertation will facilitate understanding of 
what codes of practice are, what forms they may take and what makes them 
successful or unsuccessful. Using this understanding, this dissertation aims to establish 
what form a national forest code of practice should take, if it were to be introduced 
under the PNESPF.  
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2 Literature Review 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide background information on the topic 
of codes of practice in the primary production sector, with a particular focus on 
forestry, and to identify any gaps in the research to date.  
The first section of the review will focus on the potential adverse environmental 
effects of forestry earthworks operations, with some examples of forestry 
corporations’ non-compliance with existing codes of practice.  
The second section of the review will focus on what a code of practice is and how 
codes can be implemented, as well as options to consider when writing and enforcing 
a code.  
2.1 Environmental Effects of Forestry Earthworks Operations 
The reason that forestry earthworks operations are governed by codes of practice is 
because poorly managed operations have the potential to cause adverse 
environmental effects. According to the NZFOA (2007), earthworks operations can 
increase soil exposure and destabilisation, causing accelerated erosion. Further, they 
can also cause excessive levels of sediment discharge into waterways. Sediment in the 
waterways decreases water quality (Figure 1), and so can have an effect on waterway 
ecology, landscape, and community and cultural values (NZFOA, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Sediment discharge into water, and resultant sedimentation 
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Another potential impact of poorly managed operations is the deposition of forest 
debris in waterways and downstream areas. Logging debris or “slash” (such as waste 
wood and branches) slides downhill as the soil erodes, moving from the harvested area 
or “cutover” into the gullies and waterways below. This can also be caused by landing 
failure. Landing failure can occur when the landing is overloaded with slash and the 
structural integrity of the landing is compromised by erosion. The piles of slash, or 
“bird nests”, on the landing then slide downslope onto the cutover. Once the debris 
enters a waterway, it continues downstream until an obstacle causes the debris to 
back up. This is often where damage is first noticed, as the debris backs up against 
bridges, culverts or farm fences. Otherwise, the debris can be deposited in streams 
(Figure 2) and on floodplains, in paddocks, or on beaches (Douglas, Stokes, & Wairoa 
Soil Conservation Ltd, 2011). 
 
Figure 2: A debris dam, created when slash from the cutover moved into the gully 
 
 
The effects of erosion events, allegedly caused or exacerbated by forestry operations, 
have featured in the media a number of times in recent years. High-intensity rainfall 
events around New Zealand which caused sediment and logging debris to wash 
downstream, damaging property (Figure 3) and infrastructure, have brought this issue 
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into the limelight. Recent events include a “log avalanche” at Tapawera in May 20101 
and flooding in the Nelson region in December 20112. 
 
Figure 3: Debris on downstream properties after the Tapawera flood, May 2010 
Source: http://www.stuff.co.nz/nelson-mail/news/3705485/Log-avalanche-as-flood-hits 
 
 
Under the RMA, causing adverse environmental effects can leave the perpetrator 
liable for prosecution for breaching their resource consent conditions. In March 2010, 
one of New Zealand’s major forest management corporations, PF Olsen Limited, was 
fined $80,000 for breaching the RMA. During a “one in twenty year” rainfall event, 
several piles of logging debris collapsed, releasing sediment and logging debris into 
waterways. Environment Bay of Plenty stated that they “hoped the prosecution and 
subsequent fines will act as a deterrent to other companies”3. 
The Northland District Council have reported that when resource consents are issued 
for forestry, the level of compliance with codes of practice is generally high. However, 
non-compliance with codes of practice is more common when the activity is classed as 
‘permitted’. This is apparently also an issue in the Auckland and Waikato regions. It is 
suspected that a lack of education, and hence ignorance, of the rules and 
                                                     
1
 http://www.stuff.co.nz/nelson-mail/news/3705485/Log-avalanche-as-flood-hits. Nelson Mail. Log avalanche as 
flood hits. Visited 11 Apr 2012.  
2
 http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/6141806/Slips-causing-major-problems-in-Nelson. Nelson Mail. Slips causing 
major problems in Nelson. Visited 11 Apr 2012. 
3
 http://www.nzfoa.org.nz/news/forestry-news/533-190310aforestrynews. NZ Forest Owners Assoc. Forestry 
company fined for RMA offences. Visited 13 Sept 2012. 
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environmental effects is a major reason that non-compliance is so high in ‘permitted’ 
activities4. 
The adverse environmental effects which can occur if forest operations are poorly 
managed can have some serious consequences. Sedimentation and slash deposition 
can affect the environment in the immediate area and downstream. It can also affect 
people by damaging downstream properties and infrastructure. In turn, by causing 
these effects, the industry can incur public criticism, prosecution and fines. There are 
tools available which can be used to avoid these effects. One of these tools is forest 
codes of practice for erosion and sediment control. 
2.2 Codes of Practice 
2.2.1 What is a ‘code of practice’? 
A code of practice can be defined as “a body of rules for practical guidance only, or 
that sets out professional standards of behaviour, but does not have the force of law” 
(Law & Martin, 2009). There are several codes of practice which pertain to forestry 
operations; however, codes of practice exist for many other applications.  In New 
Zealand, codes of practice are issued by the government. For example, the Ministry of 
Education has a Code of Practice for the Pastoral Care of International Students5, the 
Ministry for Economic Development has several Electrical Codes of Practice6, and the 
Privacy Commissioner has approved several codes under the Privacy Act 19937. 
Organisations or corporations may also issue codes of practice, for example, 
Fert Research have released a Code of Practice for Nutrient Management8, and The 
New Zealand Ice Cream Manufacturers Association has their own code for food 
safety9.  
                                                     
4
 http://www.nrc.govt.nz/News-Archive/2011/Foresters-urged-to-lift-game-on-sediment/. Northland Regional 
Council. Foresters urged to lift game on sediment. Visited 13 Sept 2012. 
5
http://www.minedu.govt.nz/NZEducation/EducationPolicies/InternationalEducation/ForProvidersOfInternationalE
ducation/CodeofPracticeforInternationalStudents/CodeOfPractice.aspx. Ministry of Education. The Code of Practice. 
Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
6
  http://www.energysafety.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____18586.aspx. Ministry of Economic 
Development. Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
7
  http://privacy.org.nz/codes-of-practice/. Privacy Commissioner. Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
8
  http://www.fertresearch.org.nz/code-of-practice. Fert Research. Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
9
  http://www.nzicecream.org.nz/code.htm. NZ Ice Cream Manufacturers Association. Interim Code of Practice. 
Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
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Given that the focus of this review is on forestry, it is worth noting that codes of 
practice cover several aspects of the industry. The Department of Labour have 
published a number of approved codes of practice, guidelines and bulletins relating to 
health and safety in the forestry workplace10 as recommended means of compliance 
with the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992. Members of the New Zealand 
Institute of Forestry (NZIF) are bound by the NZIF Code of Ethics11 and are held liable 
for breaches. The NZ Forest Owners’ Association have published two codes of practice; 
“Eliminating Drugs & Alcohol from the Workplace”12 and “The NZ Environmental Code 
of Practice for Plantation Forestry”(NZ Forest Owners Association, 2007). The latter is 
one of the codes which will be evaluated later in this document. 
Codes of forest practice are collections of regulations or guidelines developed to aid 
foresters in the selection of practices to follow when conducting forest management 
and utilisation operations (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). They are also a form of forest 
policy used to promote particular environmental values (Adams, 1996). The 
underpinning theory is that the desired outcome of sustainable forest management 
can be achieved by conforming to the regulations or guidelines outlined in the code 
(Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). However, codes of practice can be affected by parallel 
regulatory standards which have higher legal standing or deal with planning rather 
than daily execution of operations (Hawkes, 1999). 
2.2.2 Previous Research 
Some research has been done previously into the area of forest codes of practice, but 
none has specifically focussed on New Zealand. Some key documents are:  
1) Dykstra & Heinrich’s (1996) model forest code of practice, published by the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) to guide nations in 
developing their own codes. 
                                                     
10
 http://www.osh.dol.govt.nz/order/catalogue/#fe. Department of Labour. Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
11
http://www.nzif.org.nz/Folder?Action=View%20File&Folder_id=85&File=NZIF%20Code%20of%20Ethics%20%28af
ter%202011%20AGM%29%20%286%20Nov%2011%29.pdf. NZ Institute of Forestry. NZ Institute of Forestry (Inc.) 
Code of Ethics. Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
12
 http://www.nzfoa.org.nz/file-libraries-a-resources/cat_view/27-codes-of-practice/28-drugs-a-alcohol. NZ Forest 
Owner’s Association. Eliminating Drugs & Alcohol from the Workplace. Visited 16 Nov 2011. 
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2) As part of an inquiry into the forest and timber industry, the Australian Resource 
Assessment Commission (RAC) conducted an assessment of each state/territory’s 
regulatory framework (RAC, 1991). 
3) Several papers on forest codes of practice were presented at the Institute of 
Foresters of Australia’s 18th biennial conference. These papers by Hawkes (1999), 
Wilkinson (1999) and Williams, et al. (1999) analysed how codes were developed and 
used to regulate forestry in Australia.  
The research outlined above formed the basis of the present review of types of codes 
of practice, and the methods used for the assessment of codes of practice. 
2.2.3 Types of Codes of Practice 
The reviewed literature suggests that there are four different types of codes of 
practice. 
1. Codes of practice based on legislative mandates 
Failure to comply with the code is discouraged through disincentives, i.e. 
breaches of the code may result in penalties, such as fines, being imposed 
(Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). Detailed recommendations are established in 
guidelines, accompanied by broad requirements established in legislation 
(Moore & Bull, 2004). 
 
2. Codes which serve as voluntary guidelines 
The intention is to achieve the desired outcome through encouraging the 
adoption of certain practices, without actually mandating them. Alternative 
practices which also achieve the desired result would also be deemed 
acceptable (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). 
 
3. Codes formed as part of legislated forest management plans 
Legislation outlines general provisions for and mandates the provision of a 
forest management plan. This plan must contain a code of required practices 
for that management area. Once a code is adopted in an approved plan, it 
acquires force of law and must be adhered to (Moore & Bull, 2004). 
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4. Certification standards 
Voluntary compliance with the code’s standards; made up of principles, criteria 
and indicators; is encouraged by offering an incentive.  Once a third party 
confirms compliance, a certificate is awarded which certifies the enterprise or 
management area as ‘well-managed’. Such standards are used by certification 
schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council (Moore & Bull, 2004). 
 
In defining the ‘type’ of a code of practice, there are several aspects to be considered. 
The reviewed literature identified three main aspects: whether the practices in the 
code are voluntary or mandated, whether the code specifies detailed prescriptions or 
general principles, and whether compliance is self-managed, institutionally certified or 
government regulated. These aspects are explained further below. 
Mandated or Voluntary Practices 
Mandated or voluntary practices each have advantages and disadvantages. Generally, 
mandatory practices are more easily administered because the regulatory body need 
only determine if the practices have been adhered to or not. By comparison, voluntary 
practices are harder to administer because the regulatory body must determine if the 
desired outcome has been achieved or not. However, voluntary guidelines are more 
flexible, and so can readily be adjusted to adapt recommended practices to fit new 
knowledge or altered conditions (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). 
The issue of liability should also be considered before deciding if mandated or 
voluntary practices are the best option. Under voluntary guidelines, there is flexibility 
for managers to choose an alternative practice. Whether or not the recommended 
practice is followed, if the manager fails to achieve the desired outcome, then they are 
liable to incur penalty, be it prosecution or another form of disincentive. By 
comparison, if, having adhered to legally mandated practices, the manager fails to 
achieve the desired outcome, then the government is liable because they wrote the 
legislation (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). 
Often, a code of forest practice will use a combination of both mandatory and 
voluntary practices. If particular practices are deemed essential, or if it is very difficult 
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or impossible to determine if the desired outcomes have been achieved, then those 
practices can be mandated. The remainder of the code’s practices can be 
recommended under voluntary guidelines (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996).  
Self-management, Institutional Certification or Government Regulation 
Government regulation imposes penalties for failure to either follow mandated 
practices or to achieve the desired outcomes. Self-management focuses on promoting 
good practices through training, education and co-operation (Wilkinson, 1999). There 
are also certification schemes run by independent institutions, such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC)13, the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC)14 and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)15. 
Whether government regulation or self-management is used will stem from the choice 
between mandated or voluntary practices. Mandated practices will require 
government regulation, because the discouragement of poor outcomes through the 
use of disincentives will only be effective if those disincentives are applied (Hawkes, 
1999; Wilkinson, 1999). When a code is government regulated, the resulting system is 
costly for both the government and the industry. Under self-management, the 
government incurs less cost overall, and so can afford to focus on key areas; and 
industry has greater flexibility and independence to improve environmental 
performance. Under government regulation, the industry tends to achieve only the 
minimum standards necessary to avoid penalty; whereas under self-management 
regimes, a trend of “pursuit of excellence” comes to the fore (Wilkinson, 1999).  
The socio-economic environment should also be considered before deciding on 
relative levels of self-management and government regulation. Self-management has 
the potential to be successful if it has the support of all stakeholders and the 
workforce is well-trained, well-resourced and motivated (Wilkinson, 1999). However, 
government regulation and enforcement is also a growing trend as the public demand 
greater accountability from forest managers (Eddins & Flick, 1997). Wilkinson (1999) 
                                                     
13
 http://www.fsc.org/certification.4.htm. Forest Stewardship Council. Visited 28 Jul 2012.  
14
 http://www.pefc.org/about-pefc/who-we-are. Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification. Visited 28 
Jul 2012. 
15
 http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm. International Organisation for Standardisation. Visited 28 Jul 2012. 
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suggests that any system should have some level of government regulation to monitor 
compliance and impose penalties if self-management fails to deliver acceptable 
outcomes.  
There is also the question of how government regulation would be carried out. Will the 
regulation be conducted by an all-encompassing single agency, or will it be conducted 
by various units of local governments? A single agency approach ensures standards are 
applied consistently, whereas a multiple-agency approach can result in the forest 
ecosystem being split between various agencies that handle individual elements such 
as soil, water, wildlife and recreation (Wilkinson, 1999). This can lead to increased 
bureaucracy for forest managers to deal with (Eddins & Flick, 1997), and reduce the 
government’s ability to manage the full range of forest values as a whole (Ellefson, 
Cheng, & Moulton, 1997). Further, conflict between regulations can make it difficult to 
comply with standards. For example, Hawkes (1999) notes that some prescriptions for 
road drainage, which were intended to minimise erosion, had negative impacts on 
vehicle safety. 
Prescriptive Codes or Outcome Based Codes 
Prescriptive codes are audited by checking if the prescriptions have been adhered to, 
whereas outcome based codes are audited by checking if the desired outcome has 
been achieved or not (Williams, et al., 1999). A prescription is mandatory and will be 
very detailed (e.g. “No harvesting is to occur within 15m of any waterway”), whilst 
outcome based codes will be made up of guidelines which are more flexible (e.g. 
“Consider the benefits of wider riparian setbacks”) (Wilkinson, 1999). Generally, 
outcome based codes are impractical to audit. For example, consider a code intended 
to prevent unacceptable impacts on soil and water values by forestry through 
measuring levels of sedimentation in waterways. In practice, using the outcome as a 
measure of impact would require measuring the ‘natural’ sediment load patterns for 
comparison, and the actual monitoring is costly, labour-intensive and long-term 
(Williams, et al., 1999). 
Williams, et al. (1999) propose that prescription auditing and compliance is easier for 
both auditor and operator, because both know exactly what is permitted and 
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prohibited. Under an outcome based code, both parties will need to determine which 
practices will achieve the desired outcome. Consider the sedimentation example: 
under an outcomes based code, the operator will need to make a judgement as to 
whether or not the operation will produce sedimentation in excess of the acceptable 
levels. Under a prescriptive code, they need only observe the prescription to ensure 
compliance. The risk of not achieving environmentally satisfactory outcomes is 
transferred from the operator and forest manager to the regulatory body that 
approved the code of practice (Williams, et al., 1999). However, Dykstra & Heinrich 
(1996) state that overly prescriptive codes can stifle initiative and make it hard for 
operators to adapt to changing conditions. 
2.3 Discussion & Conclusions 
There is potential for adverse environmental effects to arise from poorly planned 
and/or managed forestry operations. The ramifications of those environmental effects 
for the forest industry are sobering; the industry would prefer to avoid negative press 
and/or prosecution over those adverse effects. There is a need for codes of practice 
for forest managers to refer to as they plan and manage earthworks operations. The 
literature has shown that there are many different types of codes, each with their own 
advantages and disadvantages. It has been recommended that a national forest code 
of practice for erosion and sediment control should be introduced (Bloomberg, et al., 
2011), but what type of code should be used? 
Before looking at a potential future national code of practice for erosion and sediment 
control, it is worthwhile to consider the existing codes of practice. Several different 
types of codes of practice are already in use in New Zealand: voluntary and mandatory, 
self-managed and government-regulated, and prescriptive and outcome-based. 
Although there has been research on different types of codes, the codes used in New 
Zealand forestry have not been looked at specifically. This gap in existing research 
needs to be addressed. By analysing the existing codes of practice, the strengths and 
weaknesses of those codes can be identified and then adopted or avoided respectively 
when developing a national code.  
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The literature on types of codes of practice also outlines some of the conditions under 
which the codes may be successfully implemented and the potential merits and 
drawbacks of these conditions have been described. The literature indicates that 
addressing these conditions are important for a code to succeed, but does not 
explicitly state which combination of type of code and conditions is best.  In addition to 
identifying what type of code should be adopted as a national code of practice, the 
conditions under which this code should be introduced must also be identified. These 
conditions can be classified into two groups: ‘internal’ and ‘external’ conditions. 
Internal conditions are those which can be assessed looking only at the code of 
practice as a document, i.e. those which are written in the code. External conditions 
are those other factors which influence the success of a code of practice, but are not 
necessarily included within the written code. These factors include the broader legal, 
social and economic context within which the code of practice exists.  
2.4 Research Questions 
Based on the reviewed literature and the issues outlined above, the following research 
questions will be addressed in this dissertation. 
1. Under what conditions is a code of practice more likely to succeed in protecting the 
environment? What are the broader legal and social conditions, i.e. ‘external 
conditions’, under which a code will be more successful? What are the strict 
criteria that a code should meet, i.e. ‘internal conditions’, to be successful?  
2. As part of the overall RMA policy and legislative framework, what are the strengths 
and weaknesses of New Zealand’s existing forest codes of practice for erosion and 
sediment control? 
3. If a national forest code of practice for erosion and sediment control was to be 
adopted, what type of code should be used, and under what conditions?  
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3 Development of criteria for classification and assessment 
of codes of practice 
In order to answer the first research question on the conditions required for a code to 
be successful, those conditions have to be identified. Those conditions were used to 
form a set of criteria, which were used to answer the second research question on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the existing codes of practice and the third question on 
what type a national code of practice should be.  
3.1 External Conditions 
3.1.1 Motivation and Agency 
Not all differences in external conditions will make a code of practice more or less 
successful. As has already been outlined in the literature review, there are many 
different types of codes and they can be implemented in various ways. It is useful to be 
able to classify codes, as not all external conditions will apply to every type of code. 
For example, non-compliance with an institutions’ voluntary code of practice may not 
be associated with prosecution by government agencies. 
Based upon synthesis of the reviewed literature, a model to explain why a forest 
management corporation would adopt a forest code of practice for erosion and 
sediment control is proposed. The Motivation & Agency Model (MAM) can be used to 
describe and compare the conditions under which codes of practice are adopted, and 
the agencies which develop and implement them. This will help to identify which 
conditions apply to the existing codes of practice and also which should be applied to a 
future national code. 
Agency 
There are three types of agencies which can develop a code of practice and require 
compliance by a corporation. These agency types are government, other institutions, 
and the corporation itself. The effects of these agencies are not mutually exclusive, 
several agencies can affect compliance at once (Figure 4). For example, a code of 
practice may be developed by an outside institution, but the implementation of the 
code and monitoring of environmental effects may be left to the corporation. Or, an 
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institution-developed code may be mandated by the government, by including 
compliance with the code as a condition in resource consents. 
 
  
Figure 4: Effect of agencies which can develop and require compliance with codes of 
practice (See Explanatory Note, pg 15). 
 
Motivation 
Once a code of practice has been published, there are three reasons, or motivations, 
for a corporation to adopt it. Compliance with a code of practice can be mandated, 
such as under the RMA. A corporation may choose to adopt a code for financial 
reasons, such as avoiding fines or to gain subsidies or better market access. Or, a 
corporation may choose to adopt a code simply for the sake of altruism, or to create 
the perception that it is altruistic. 
Again, these motivations are not mutually exclusive; more than one can apply at once 
(Figure 5). For example, when compliance with a code of practice is mandated in 
resource consents, a corporation complies not only because the law says it must, but 
also because failure to do so can lead to fines and bad publicity, both of which have a 
financial effect. A corporation may volunteer to comply with a code of practice not 
only to gain financial reward, but also out of a sense of responsibility to society or to its 
industry, or to create the perception of altruism.  
Agency 
Effect 
Corporation Government 
Institution 
 15 
Figure 5: Motivations for a corporation to adopt a code of practice.  
(See Explanatory Note below). 
 
Explanatory Note for Agency Effect and Motivation diagrams 
The effect of an agency/ motivation can be exclusive (i.e. one vertex of the triangle), or 
it can be a combination of two or three agencies/motivations. The contribution of each 
agency effect/motivation is a continuum ranging from 0 – 100 percent, and the sum of 
all three must equal 100 percent. Consider the examples below. 
  
   
Not all combinations of motivations and agencies under the MAM are possible. The 
potential combinations are outlined and explained overleaf (Table 1). 
Motivation 
Mandated: 33% 
Altruistic: 33% 
Financial: 33% 
 
Motivation 
Mandated: 0% 
Altruistic: 50% 
Financial: 50% 
 
Motivation 
Mandated: 100% 
Altruistic: 0% 
Financial: 0% 
 
Motivation 
Altruistic Financial 
Mandated 
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Table 1: Possible basic combinations of agency effect and motivation 
Agency Motivation Possible Explanation 
Government 
Mandated  
Codes of practice published by local governments 
are mandated in resource consents issued under the 
RMA. 
Financial  
Governments can provide financial incentives, in the 
form of subsidies, grants or fines, for compliance or 
non-compliance with codes of practice. 
Altruistic  
A government-issued code of practice would be part 
of a larger system such as those mentioned above. A 
government would not issue a code of practice in 
hope that a corporation would adopt it out of 
altruism. 
Institution 
Mandated  
Although an institution could mandate that 
members must follow a code of practice, a 
corporation’s decision to be a member of that 
institution remains voluntary. Hence, unlike 
government-mandated codes, an institution’s code 
cannot be forced upon corporations. 
Financial  
If an institution offers certification, compliance with 
codes of practice can provide market access. 
Altruistic  
Example: The existing Environmental Code of 
Practice for Plantation Forestry is not an enforced 
code of practice and offers no financial incentives. A 
corporation which chooses to follow this code does 
so out of a sense of social responsibility.  
Corporation 
Mandated  
Governments could mandate that corporations 
produce their own code of practice, which the 
government could approve and then expect a 
corporation to abide by. 
Financial  
A corporation may produce and abide by a code of 
practice to show outside institutions that they are 
environmentally responsible in a bid to gain 
certification, and in turn, market access. 
Altruistic  
Corporations may produce a code of practice purely 
because they want to, or feel obliged to, out of a 
sense of corporate social responsibility. 
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3.1.2 Case Studies from the International Primary Sector 
In New Zealand, the reduction, mitigation and avoidance of adverse environmental 
effects is legislated by the RMA and by issuing of resource consents under that Act. 
Although this study is focussed on the New Zealand forestry industry, it is worth noting 
that other systems for managing environmental effects exist in other countries and 
primary industries. Three case studies were analysed. Two focussed on agriculture and 
one on forestry; in England, Greece and West Virginia, USA respectively. 
Agriculture – England 
A case study was carried out by Posthumus, et al. (2011) to understand how current 
legislation and policies affected soil degradation prevention in England. There are two 
kinds of legislation and policies which address soil degradation: mandatory and 
voluntary. 
Two pieces of legislation relate to soil degradation. The Highways Act 1980 enables the 
Environment Agency to sue farmers for causing preventable muddy floods on a road. 
The Water Resources Act 1991 stipulates that causing poisonous/noxious/toxic 
material or solid waste to enter a waterway, whether deliberately or by accident, is 
illegal. The latter, however, is not considered to be effectively enforced because the 
very nature of erosion makes it difficult to prove liability. Further, some breaches could 
be argued to have been caused by extreme, out-of-season weather events 
(Posthumus, et al., 2011). 
The two mandatory policy instruments to prevent soil degradation are Statutory 
Management Requirements (SMR) and Good Agricultural and Environmental 
Conditions (GAEC). Farmers are financially rewarded for complying with the standards, 
and failure to comply results in the reduction or loss of payments. The GAEC requires 
farmers to produce Soil Protection Reviews (SPR) to identify and address soil 
management issues, but farm advisors indicated that SPR are not effective because 
they only raise awareness of issues, without obliging farmers to address them because 
monitoring is minimal. Farmers also disliked the SPR because of the extra paperwork 
they required (Posthumus, et al., 2011). 
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The Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) is a voluntary, incentivised, three-tier 
programme. Farmers produce Farm Environmental Records (FER), which identify 
paddocks with high erosion and/or runoff risks. The lowest level of the scheme allows 
farmers to choose which prescriptions to adhere to, so there is a tendency to choose 
those which are least demanding or highest paying. The higher levels of the scheme 
are more restrictive and require more administration work, but the difference in 
financial incentive is not high enough to encourage farmers to subscribe to a higher 
level (Posthumus, et al., 2011). 
The relationship between the enforcement agency and farmers is also important. 
Farmers reported that they preferred if a friendlier approach was used, such as officers 
working with farmers to identify and rectify potential breaches, rather than sending 
letters threatening prosecution. However, farm advisors felt that this approach also led 
farmers to not fear prosecution, leading them to take more risks to achieve greater 
profits (Posthumus, et al., 2011). 
For soil conservation to be successful, agencies need to engage farmers. To do this, 
they must understand why farmers do or do not participate in schemes. Posthumus, et 
al. (2011) found the main reason that farmers participated was for the financial 
rewards. The main reasons they did not were because they felt it restricted their 
management options and flexibility to react to markets. Generally, farmers were 
concerned about soil degradation if it reduced productivity, led to prosecution, or 
caused a loss of grant payments (Posthumus, et al., 2011). 
 Agriculture – Greece 
A case study by Barbayiannis, et al. (2011) analysed how policy influenced soil 
conservation in Greek agriculture. The major policy instrument in Greek agriculture is 
the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), of which the incentivised 
GAEC is a part. 
There are three institutions which influence farm management decisions, and hence, 
soil conservation. These are the state, through national, regional and local agencies; 
farming co-operatives; and environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs). 
The ENGOs have criticised the implementation of CAP, because there was no genuine 
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public consultation stage and it is not well-coordinated. In interviews, government and 
non-government officials indicated that the establishment of new institutional 
structures has been delayed because of conflict within and between the various 
institutions. These delays had been caused by conflicting government policies 
managed by different ministries, a lack of clear management plans for some 
organisations and understaffing. Poor decision-making in directing funding for 
preparation of long-term infrastructure was also a problem. For example, a lack of 
modern GIS tools meant there was no detailed and coherent soil map, which impeded 
soil management on a national scale (Barbayiannis, et al., 2011). 
Inconsistency between agricultural policies and other policies confused farmers and 
led them to lose trust in the government. For example, one policy offered subsidies for 
the purchase of heavy machinery, whilst another dictated that the use of heavy 
machinery should be avoided to reduce soil erosion and compaction (Barbayiannis, et 
al., 2011). 
Forestry – West Virginia, USA 
In West Virginia, concern over sediment from forestry operations led to the 
introduction of the Logging Sediment Control Act 1992 (LSCA). Wang, et al. (2004) 
reviewed this legislation, the five reforms of best management practices (BMP), and 
how they are implemented. 
Each logging job must be supervised by a certified logger. To gain certification, one 
must successfully complete training in first aid, health and safety, and BMP. Under the 
LSCA, the foresters of the West Virginia Division of Forestry (WVDoF) are responsible 
for enforcing BMP. As such, they are able to issue loggers with compliance orders if 
there is a potential for soil erosion and/or water pollution. Breaches can also result in 
suspension orders, and it is estimated that the average crew would lose at least 
US$4000 per day suspended. Recent changes to the LSCA have given WVDoF foresters 
the power to issue criminal citations and fines of between $250 and $500, per day, per 
violation (Wang, et al., 2004). 
The LSCA appears to be effective. Since 1992, compliance with the LSCA has shown an 
upward annual trend, with a ten percent increase in compliance over the period 
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1998 to 2001. It has been speculated that the introduction of misdemeanour fines, and 
continuing education programs for loggers, will further increase compliance (Wang, et 
al., 2004). 
BMP are not stagnant, they are flexible and can be changed as needed. The BMP 
pre-date the LSCA by twenty years. A committee reviews the BMP every three years, 
or sooner if required. The BMP have been revised five times since 1972 (Wang, et al., 
2004). 
Lessons from International Case Studies 
The case of England’s SPR illustrates that raising awareness of environmental issues is 
a positive thing, but is not necessarily useful if land managers are not obliged to act. 
The SPR could be considered a poorly implemented regulatory system, because it is 
disliked by the land managers and is seen as ineffective by the enforcers. This 
highlights two issues which should be kept in mind; a system should be designed so 
that the land managers see it as a useful tool rather than an obstacle, and adequate 
monitoring needs to be carried out to actually enforce the system. In the case of the 
SRP, the system was disliked because of the excessive paperwork, so it is important 
that a code of practice should require minimal bureaucracy and ‘paper pushing’. 
The situation in England has also shown that it is difficult to prove liability for erosion. 
The Water Resources Act 1991 is outcome-based, and is not dissimilar to New Zealand 
legislation. Given the difficulty that England has had proving liability of and prosecuting 
farmers for erosion and sedimentation, it calls into question if outcomes-based 
legislation is the best way to prevent these adverse environmental effects. It would 
make more sense to assess the actions of land managers rather than assess outcomes 
which may be beyond their control if there is an extreme weather event. 
The English case study shows that for a code to be successful there needs to be a good 
working relationship between land managers and the authorities. A friendly approach 
is less likely to be met with resistance than a threatening approach. However, it is also 
important that the land managers respect the authorities and do not dismiss their 
advice. This friendly relationship is achievable, as illustrated by the Northland Regional 
Council. The council offers training on sediment controls and invites land managers to 
 21 
ask for advice, because it prefers to educate land managers rather than prosecute 
them. At the same time, the council makes no secret that it is prepared to, and does, 
prosecute offenders16. Although this relationship cannot be stipulated in a code, it is a 
condition required to make a code successful, and so should be kept in mind when 
implementing a code of practice. 
Another key lesson to come from the English case study is that the primary motivation 
for farmers to participate in schemes is financial. Given that forestry is also a business, 
it is fair to assume that foresters are driven by a similar motivation. A regulatory 
system needs to have sufficient incentives or disincentives to encourage or discourage 
certain practices. Putting aside the idea of offering subsidies for good practice, this 
means that fines issued under the RMA need to be sufficient to discourage forest 
managers from taking risks. For this to be effective, however, the evidence used to 
justify prosecution needs to be robust. Given the difficulty that English authorities 
have had proving liability for sedimentation and erosion it may prove difficult to 
actually fine corporations in New Zealand too, thus neutralising the threat of fines. 
The Greek case study highlighted the importance of cooperation between all the 
agencies involved in development to avoid delays in establishing a new institutional 
structure. At present, the PNESPF is at the fourth of the six steps required before 
implementation. Unlike the Greek implementation of CAP, the process has included 
consultation with the public and involved parties. The PNESPF still requires the 
approval of Cabinet following the redesign currently underway17. Following, or perhaps 
accompanying, the approval of the PNESPF a national code of practice may be 
introduced. This process of approving the PNESPF and associated code has the 
potential to take a long time, and so it is important that the industry and the 
government endeavour to minimise delays and make sound decisions around the 
establishment of long-term infrastructures. 
                                                     
16
 http://www.nrc.govt.nz/News-Archive/2011/Foresters-urged-to-lift-game-on-sediment/. Northland Regional 
Council. Foresters urged to lift game on sediment. Visited 13 Sept 2012. 
17
 http://www.mfe.govt.nz/laws/standards/forestry/index.html#process. Ministry for the Environment. Process – 
where we are at. Visited 17 Sept 2012. 
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Another issue highlighted by the Greek case study was that consistency between 
policies is vital to the success of a regulatory system. In the same vein, if a code 
recommends practices which conflict with other rules, the faith that managers and 
contractors have in that code will be lessened. The effect of inconsistency between 
codes was observed during a recent field study by the author; a contractor was 
disillusioned by the rules in the regional council’s code of practice because he felt that 
the prescriptions for a sediment control posed a health and safety risk to traffic. As 
such, he did not build the sediment controls to prescription, as he felt that health and 
safety took precedence. This inconsistency could have been avoided through 
consultation between contractors, the regional authority and the Department of 
Labour. Considering the example of the proposed national forest code of practice 
which may be published by the Ministry for the Environment, then it should be written 
in consultation not only with managers, contractors and the public, but also other 
government departments such as the Department of Labour, the Department of 
Conservation and the Ministry for Primary Industries to ensure consistency between 
policies. 
The West Virginian case study presents some alternative options to ensure 
compliance. The idea of formally training and licensing operators may be worth 
consideration, but would require long-term planning first. Licensing operators could be 
included as a resource consent condition to ensure that all operators have been 
trained in the national code of practice. This could potentially be an effective way to 
facilitate the transition from regional standards to a national standard.  
If a code of practice is introduced, then the progress made can be measured by 
ensuring the code is monitored. This would help to both check that the new code is 
effective and also to note if revisions of the code make a difference to performance. 
One way of achieving this would be to record statistics on compliance, in a similar 
manner to the WVDoF, both before the introduction of and during the use of the code 
to allow comparison. 
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3.2 Internal Conditions 
3.2.1 Assessment Criteria 
The assessment of codes of practice draws on various criteria which should be present 
in a code of practice. These components are the ‘internal conditions’ that influence the 
success of a code. The eight components are outlined below by section. 
Objective 
Codes of practice should include a “well-defined and clearly stated” aim or purpose 
(RAC, 1991).  
Regulatory Approach 
The RAC (1991) recommends that a code should apply to all land tenure types: State 
forest, Crown land, freehold land and leasehold land. Further, the code should set a 
minimum standard for states, and additional standards can be added for certain areas 
(RAC, 1991). This refers to the Australian system of state and territorial governments, 
but “states” can be translated to Regional Councils to fit the New Zealand context. 
Hawkes (1999) suggests that codes should be enforceable by regulation. The RAC 
(1991) state that this should be done vigorously, and that penalties should be 
substantial. The penalties should be outlined, as well as provisions for appeal (Dykstra 
& Heinrich, 1996). Hawkes (1999) recommends that the accountability of parties 
should also be outlined. Plans should be prepared for forestry operations, and these 
should be submitted to a formal approval and monitoring process (RAC, 1991). See 
Section 2.2.3 for more information on Self-Management and Government Regulation. 
Planning 
Codes of practice should aid forest managers in the selection of operational practices. 
They should describe the potential impacts of poor practices, and detail recommended 
practices (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). This applies equally to all codes, irrespective of 
their type under the MAM, as the purpose of a code of practice is to provide guidelines 
for managers. 
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Comprehensiveness 
The RAC (1991) states that codes should be comprehensive, and lists a number of 
aspects for which codes of practice should set standards, at a minimum. Two of the 
aspects on this list relate to earthworks:  
 “…soil erosion, slope restrictions and erosion mitigation requirements; 
 roading, snigging tracks [skid trails] and log landings, their placement, 
construction, width, drainage and treatment post-harvesting…”. 
These two aspects will be included in the classification system used to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of forest codes of practice. 
Monitoring 
The type of monitoring to be carried out and the manner in which the results will be 
reported should be detailed in a code (RAC, 1991). Regardless of whether a code is 
prescription or outcome-based, compliance with the defined prescriptions or 
outcomes needs to be monitored. If monitoring is not carried out, then the code 
cannot be enforced by the agency. 
Foundation 
A code of practice should be based around policy (Hawkes, 1999). The rules in a code 
should be guided by the policies of the agency - be it a government, corporation or 
other institution. 
Adams (1996) states that in order for a code of practice to be successful, it must have a 
solid foundation of research. Again, this applies in all cases. Before setting standards in 
a code of practice, an agency should justify those standards with evidence that 
following the standards will achieve the objectives of the code. Without this evidence, 
the validity of the code can easily be called into question. 
The preparation of a code should involve appropriate stakeholders (Hawkes, 1999), so 
the endorsement of the stakeholders listed in Dykstra & Heinrich (1996) has been 
included in the assessment criteria. These stakeholders are: government forestry 
officials, forest industry representatives, loggers, the local community, 
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non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and technical experts from research 
institutes or universities (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996). 
Dykstra & Heinrich (1996) state that relevant legislation should be listed in the 
references for the code. Both Hawkes (1999) and the RAC (1991) state that the 
relationship between the code and legislation should be clear. This does not apply only 
to those government-published codes which have a direct relationship with legislation, 
as an institution’s or corporation’s code of practice may also aim to achieve 
compliance with the law.  
Communication 
Hawkes (1999) states that a code of practice must be understood. The wording must 
be clear, and the language style should be appropriate for the intended audience. This 
applies equally to all types of code, irrespective of their classification. 
Review Process 
Codes of practice should be subjected to regular review, and scrutiny and discussion of 
codes should be encouraged (RAC, 1991), to keep them up-to-date with progress in 
understanding, technology and priorities. A good code of practice should be flexible 
enough to be amended as new information becomes available (Dykstra & Heinrich, 
1996) and any amendments should be made in consultation with stakeholders 
(Hawkes, 1999). 
This applies equally to all types of code. Government codes will need to be reviewed as 
legislation and public opinion – and so, government policy – changes. Institutional 
codes will need to be reviewed as the objectives of the institution change, and likewise 
for corporations. Assuming a code is based on sound research, its prescribed practices 
or outcomes may also need to be reviewed as new research becomes available. 
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4 Assessment and Classification of Codes of Practice 
In order to address the second research question on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the existing codes of practice used in New Zealand, those codes were assessed by their 
external and internal conditions as outlined in Section 3. 
4.1 Methods 
The assessment of the reviewed codes of practice for erosion and sediment control 
was carried out in two phases; a classification by type, motivation and agency, and an 
assessment of which internal conditions were met. 
4.1.1  Assessing the external conditions that affect a code of practice 
Each of the six reviewed codes of practice were classified by their motivation and 
agency as described under the MAM in Section 3.1.1, and by their type, as described in 
the literature review in Section 2.2.3. 
The external conditions which affect the success of a code (Table 2) were identified in 
the international case studies in Section 3.1.2. A future study should build upon this list 
and identify any other external conditions. The external conditions which can affect a 
code’s success have not been included in this assessment. To carry out such an 
assessment would, at least, require interviewing forest managers and council officers, 
a review of policies across various government agencies, and analysis of monitoring 
systems. This would be a significant undertaking and is beyond the scope of this study.  
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Table 2: External conditions required for a code of practice or wider regulatory system 
to be successful, as identified in the international case studies of primary industries. 
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 There is a good working relationship between managers and the agency 
The regulatory system is perceived by managers as a useful tool, rather than an 
obstacle 
The system requires minimal paperwork 
(Dis)incentives are sufficient to encourage/discourage certain practices 
 
4.1.2 Assessing the internal conditions that affect a code’s success 
The internal conditions that affect the success of a code of practice were identified in 
Section 3.2.1, and have been used to develop a set of formal assessment criteria used 
to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the codes of practice. 
By calculating the percentage of applicable criteria that had been met, each of the 
eight sections was scored out of one hundred; allowing the codes to be compared on a 
like-for-like basis. The assessment criteria consist of eight sections, as previously 
outlined in Section 3.2.1. The internal conditions listed in these eight sections have all 
been found to be vital in the literature for a code of practice to succeed. The codes’ 
internal conditions were assessed by noting if a code had met the individual criteria or 
not.  Some criteria which were not applicable to a certain code were marked as 
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‘not applicable’; for example, the Unsealed Roads Manual (Giumarra, 2009) was not 
assessed against forestry-specific conditions because it is not a forestry document. A 
full breakdown of the assessment of internal conditions, with the results for each 
criterion, can be found in Appendix 1. 
The assessment of some of these criteria is preliminary, rather than definitive. 
Although much of the assessment was based on presence or absence of content from 
the code of practice, in some cases a judgement had to be made based on the 
available evidence. For example, “Penalties for breaches are outlined” is a yes/no 
question and simple to assess, whereas “Language is appropriate for intended 
audience” requires a judgement to be made. This is a limitation of this study. If this 
study were to be extended, surveying a panel of end-users of the codes would provide 
a stronger basis to the assessment. 
4.2 Assessment Results 
4.2.1 Classification of External Conditions 
The results show that all of the codes of practice fit into one of two classifications 
under the MAM and types of codes of practice. Four of the codes can be classified as 
‘Type 2: Code which serves as a voluntary guideline’, and have an institution agency 
and voluntary motivation under the MAM. The other two codes can be classified as 
‘Type 1: Code of practice based on legislative mandates’, and have a government 
agency and mandatory motivation under the MAM (Table 3).  
Note that the classification of a code of practice does not necessarily indicate the level 
of success of a code. It can, however, indicate what the ideal external conditions for a 
code are and allows the identification of potential issues associated with a particular 
type of code. These issues were outlined in the literature review in Section 2.2.3.  
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Table 3: Classification of six forest codes of practice for erosion and sediment control used in New Zealand, by agency, motivation and type. 
 
Code of Practice Agency Motivation Type 
New Zealand Forest Code of Practice, Second Edition (1993) 
Institution, published by 
the Logging Industry 
Research Organisation. 
Voluntary 
2. Code which serves as 
voluntary guideline. 
New Zealand Environmental Code of Practice for Plantation Forestry 
(2007) 
Institution, published by 
the NZFOA. 
Voluntary, although the 
NZFOA “recommends” 
that its members adhere 
to the code. 
2. Code which serves as 
voluntary guideline. 
Forestry Operations in the Auckland Region, A Guideline for Erosion 
and Sediment Control TP223 (2007) 
Government; published by 
the Auckland Regional 
Council. 
Mandated; referenced in 
resource consents issued 
under RMA. 
1. Codes of practice based 
on legislative mandates. 
Erosion & Sediment Control, Guidelines for Soil Disturbing Activities, 
Environment Waikato Technical Report No. 2009/02 (2009) 
Government; published by 
the Waikato Regional 
Council. 
Mandated; referenced in 
resource consents issued 
under RMA. 
1. Codes of practice based 
on legislative mandates. 
Unsealed Roads Manual: Guidelines to Good Practice, Third Edition 
(2009) 
Institution, published by 
the Australian Road 
Research Board. 
Voluntary 
2. Code which serves as 
voluntary guideline. 
New Zealand Forest Road Engineering Manual (2011) 
Institution, published by 
the NZFOA. 
Voluntary 
2. Code which serves as 
voluntary guideline. 
 
2
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4.2.2 Assessment of Internal Conditions 
Each of the codes of practice was given a score out of one hundred for each section of 
the assessment. The internal conditions were assessed in eight sections, which were 
further broken down into several criteria. Each code was assessed against all 
applicable criteria in each section and the proportion of applicable criteria which had 
been met was then calculated as a percentage. This gives a score out of one hundred 
for each of the eight sections for each code of practice (Table 4). Full details of the 
assessment are in Appendix 1.  
Table 4: Assessment scores (out of 100) for the internal conditions of the reviewed New 
Zealand codes of practice. 
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Objective 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Regulatory Approach 0 40 0 75 75 20 
Planning 100 80 100 80 60 60 
Comprehensiveness 63 60 67 81 75 82 
Monitoring 0 0 33 0 0 66 
Foundation 64 64 40 73 45 64 
Communication 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Review Process 0 0 50 50 0 0 
 
All of the codes have well-defined and clearly-stated objectives (Table 4). The objective 
helps answer an important, if not the most important, question that forest managers 
might ask: “Why should we follow this code of practice?”. By setting an objective for a 
code it is given a purpose, which not only justifies why the code exists, but also 
provides direction to those writing the code.  
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Overall, the codes of practice scored well for planning (Table 4). A key weakness in 
terms of planning was that three of the codes did not describe methods to predict the 
severity of potential adverse effects (Appendix 1: Table 5). 
Another strength of all of the assessed codes of practice is communication (Table 4). 
All the codes are well-written and the language styles and visual aids used are 
appropriate for the target audiences. The documents which are intended for use by 
engineers provide technical detail, whereas those intended for use by forest managers 
and contractors are less technical and have good visual aids such as photographs and 
diagrams. In terms of ease of use, visual representations were much easier to follow 
than large bodies of text. For example, Environment Waikato’s code made excellent 
use of photographs showing good and poor practices to visually reinforce what was 
said in the text. A national code should draw on these strengths and use visual aids; 
perhaps even use the best ones from the existing codes.  
Overall, the codes did not score well for regulatory approach, although those codes 
published by regional councils did provide the most information in this area (Table 4). 
The codes did not provide enough information on penalties and liabilities for breaches 
of the code and/or the RMA (Appendix 1: Table 5). This is a weakness which needs to 
be addressed when writing a national code. Those codes which were published by 
regional authorities did not include this information, whilst the NZFOA’s voluntary 
code included an entire section on penalties and liabilities. This information should be 
included in a code, even if it can be found in other documentation, because it 
reinforces why it is important to comply with the code. 
None of the codes consistently scored highly for comprehensiveness (Table 4). Roading 
was the only section to be covered completely by any code of practice, and neither 
skid trails nor landings were covered completely by any code (Appendix 1: Table 5). 
These shortcomings in comprehensiveness should be addressed to ensure a code 
provides all the necessary information for all three of these earthworks construction 
types. 
The foundations of all the codes of practice need improvement, with a range of scores 
between 40 and 73 (Table 4). The low scores for stakeholder endorsement and/or 
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involvement in development is concerning, with none scoring above fifty. There are up 
to six stakeholder groups which should be included in the development process 
(Section 3.2.1), and at least half of the applicable stakeholders have been excluded 
during the development of the codes of practice (Appendix 1: Table 5).  
The most concerning weakness of the codes is the lack of information on monitoring 
(Table 4). Four of the six codes fail to describe monitoring methods which can be used 
by the forest manager and/or are used by the enforcing agency. Only one of the codes 
describes how monitoring results are reported; in this case, the code provides forest 
managers with an auditing template. None of the codes define what constitutes an 
acceptable or unacceptable outcome (Appendix 1: Table 5). These shortcomings are 
concerning because the RMA is an outcomes-based environmental legislation. To 
ensure compliance a forest manager should know what outcomes to aim for or avoid, 
how they or the authorities will monitor those outcomes, and how the results of that 
monitoring should or will be reported. As such, this weakness must be addressed if a 
national code was published. 
Another weakness of all of the codes of practice was the review process, or lack 
thereof. Four of the six codes scored zero for this condition. The two which scored fifty 
were open to and invited public submission. None of the codes state they will be 
reviewed on a regular basis (Table 4). This means that the codes may not be kept up-
to-date with the latest research, innovations, or changes in government policy. 
The ‘New Zealand Forest Code of Practice’ was replaced by the ‘New Zealand 
Environmental Code of Practice for Plantation Forestry’ (NZFOA, 2007). However, the 
assessment of strengths and weaknesses of both codes indicates that the new code 
has not addressed many of the old code’s weaknesses, and in some instances is 
weaker than the old code (Table 4 and Appendix 1: Table 5). 
Although the ‘New Zealand Environmental Code of Practice for Plantation Forestry’ is a 
well-written overall forest code of practice (Table 4), it cannot be used as the sole 
guiding reference for earthworks operations. With only four pages on earthworks 
operations, it is simply not as comprehensive as the other codes reviewed. 
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5 Options for a National Code of Practice 
The third research questions asks “If a national forest code of practice for erosion and 
sediment control were to be adopted, what type of code should be used, and under 
what conditions?”. This section will discuss the options for a type of national code of 
practice. Note that this is a limited recommendation, as it has only taken account of 
internal conditions for a successful code, and the external conditions of motivation and 
agency. The other external conditions (Section 3.1.2), which have been found to be 
vital to a code of practice’s success, have not yet been assessed. As such, this is only a 
preliminary recommendation and this area still requires a significant amount of further 
research before a final recommendation can be made. 
It is straightforward to decide motivation and agency for the proposed national code of 
practice. The agency which will develop and require compliance will be the 
government, because the proposed code will accompany the Ministry for the 
Environment’s PNESPF. The motivation to comply with the code should be mandatory, 
because the code should be referenced in the PNESPF, and also financial, due to the 
threat of loss of profit from fines and damaged reputation following prosecution.  
One could argue that rather than mandating compliance, compliance with the code 
could be voluntary to give forest managers more flexibility. Whilst this is an option, 
research suggests that voluntary guidelines are harder to audit (Dykstra & Heinrich, 
1996). Keeping in mind that it is already difficult to audit sedimentation and erosion, a 
voluntary code is not the most practical option. 
The proposed national code of practice, if introduced, should be a prescriptive code. 
The reason that a prescriptive code is better than an outcome-based code is because it 
is so difficult to measure and prove liability for sedimentation and erosion, particularly 
after extreme weather events. If a robust and objective method for measuring these 
adverse environmental effects was developed, and agreed to be reliable by both 
industry and regulatory authorities, then a voluntary, outcomes-based code could be 
used. The code will set standards to avoid, remedy or mitigate negative environmental 
effects. This means that corporations will need to meet the detailed requirements set 
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out in the code to be deemed compliant. It will also require regulatory authorities to 
assess operations’ erosion and sediment controls. 
This recommendation may not seem appealing at first, due to previous experience 
with prescriptive codes of practice. Some of the existing codes, such as the Auckland 
Regional Council’s TP223, are very prescriptive and include practices that some argue 
are not practicable for forestry. The industry needs to be involved in the development 
of the national code, and forest engineering experts should provide input as to which 
erosion and sediment controls are not suitable for application to forestry earthworks, 
to prevent the code being overly-prescriptive. A prescriptive national code would 
require research to set what the best practices actually are.  
Compliance with a prescriptive code could be considered as liability insurance. 
According to Dykstra & Heinrich (1996), if a corporation is fully compliant with a 
prescriptive code of practice, it cannot be held liable for adverse environmental 
impacts. Rather, liability is transferred to the government body which set the 
prescriptions. This is a fairer system than a voluntary outcome-based code, where the 
forest manager is still liable if the environment is adversely affected, even if they have 
followed all the guidelines (Dykstra & Heinrich, 1996).  
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6 Conclusions 
The answers to the three research questions, shown below, are summarised in this 
section. 
1. Under what conditions is a code of practice more likely to succeed in protecting 
the environment? What are the broader legal and social conditions; i.e. 
‘external conditions’; under which a code will be more successful? What are the 
strict criteria that a code should meet; i.e. ‘internal conditions’; to be 
successful?  
2. As part of the overall RMA policy and legislative framework, what are the 
strengths and weaknesses of New Zealand’s existing forest codes of practice for 
erosion and sediment control? 
3. If a national forest code of practice for erosion and sediment control was to be 
adopted, what type of code should be used, and under what conditions? 
6.1 Conditions for success 
The conditions that a code of practice must operate under to be successful can be 
classified in terms of internal or external conditions. 
6.1.1 External conditions 
For a code of practice to succeed in protecting the environment, it should be 
implemented under ideal external conditions. The code should be developed so that 
land managers consider the code to be a useful tool rather than a bureaucratic 
obstacle which creates more paperwork. There should be a friendly working 
relationship between land managers and enforcement authorities, with enforcement 
authorities offering training and advice on practices. To ensure that the codes of 
practice are respected and not dismissed, the financial disincentives for non-
compliance should be significant enough to influence managers’ decision-making. 
A code will be more successful if it is developed in consultation with all the affected 
parties; such as landowners, land managers, contractors and the public. To ensure 
consistency between policies and to prevent undermining the trust that land managers 
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place in enforcement authorities, the code should be developed in consultation with 
other relevant government departments and certification schemes. 
6.1.2 Internal conditions 
The internal conditions required for a code of practice to succeed refers to the 
information printed in the code, and so these can be assessed by looking at the code 
itself. A successful code of practice should have a well-defined and clearly stated 
objective; include sufficient information on regulatory approach, such as penalties and 
liabilities; and be a useful tool for planning. It should also have comprehensive 
information on roading, skid trails and landings; detail monitoring methods, results 
reporting methods and define acceptable and/or unacceptable outcomes. The code 
should also have a solid foundation built on policies, references, stakeholder 
endorsement and legislation. A successful code should communicate ideas effectively, 
be reviewed regularly and be open to public submissions. 
6.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of existing NZ codes 
The key strengths across the codes were objectives and communication. All of the six 
reviewed codes of practice had well-defined and clearly stated objectives. The codes 
effectively communicated ideas through both written and visual methods, and were 
appropriate for their target audiences. 
The key weakness across the codes was a lack of information on penalties, liabilities, 
and monitoring. Where non-compliance with a code can lead to penalties, those 
penalties, and who is liable, should be detailed in the code. As the RMA is an 
outcomes-based legislation, a code of practice should detail how monitoring is carried 
out and what is deemed an acceptable or unacceptable outcome. 
6.3 Future National Forest Code of Practice 
Based on the results of this research, it is recommended that if a national forest code 
of practice for erosion and sediment control were to be adopted, that code should be 
a prescriptive code. The agency responsible for the code should be the government 
and the motivation for compliance should be a combination of mandatory and 
financial. Note that this is only a preliminary recommendation. 
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Research should be carried out to develop adequate, but not overzealous, 
prescriptions. The enforcement of the code, to be fair on the forest industry, would 
have to assess whether prescriptions had been complied with. If a corporation is 
deemed compliant, then any adverse effects are beyond the corporation’s control and 
so it cannot be held liable. The other ‘conditions for success’ outlined in Section 6.1  
should also be applied. 
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7 Further Research Opportunities 
This dissertation has explored a topic which has not been looked at before in New 
Zealand. As such, there is still a lot of research which could be carried out in this area. 
Some questions which remain to be answered are outlined below. 
1. Is the concept of a national forest code of practice actually viable? Or are there 
actually differences between regions that require regional codes? 
2. Are the codes of practice currently used in New Zealand operating under ideal 
external conditions, including those identified in Section 4.1.1? 
3. Are forestry corporations compliant with the codes of practice which apply to 
them? 
4. What are the reasons for the New Zealand forest industry to be compliant or 
non-compliant with codes of practice, and are these reasons consistent with the 
external and internal factors identified in this dissertation? 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Assessment of NZ Codes of Practice 
Table 5: Summary of assessment of six New Zealand forest codes of practice.  
= ‘criteria met’, = ‘criteria not met’, - = ‘not applicable’ 
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Code is enforceable
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Individuals and groups liable for 
breaches are identified      
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Details potential adverse impacts of 
operations      
Recommends and details methods 
to avoid/mitigate adverse impacts 
during operation 
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Recommends and details methods 
to  avoid/mitigate adverse impacts 
after operation 
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18
 Whether a code is “enforceable” or not is not necessarily a strength or weakness, this only serves to 
indicate if the code is backed by the regulatory authorities. 
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Open to public submission      
Reviewed on a stated regular basis      
 
